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Abstract A substantial literature on nanotechnology innovation and commercial devel-
opment has characterized several elements of these phenomena as constituting new
developments in the US national innovation system. Among these elements are the
(asserted) ‘‘post-academic’’ nature of US universities’ involvement with nanotechnology
R&D, and federal funding of nanotechnology R&D on goals related to economic com-
petitiveness. This paper challenges the ‘‘novelty’’ of these elements, while suggesting that
other elements of nanotechnology R&D, including the extensive patenting of the results of
nanotechnology-related research and the emphasis within many university-industry col-
laborations on patent-based channels for ‘‘technology transfer,’’ may indeed be new and
raise questions for the long-term efficiency and innovative performance of nanotechnol-
ogy-related R&D.
Keywords Nanotechnology  National innovation system  US R&D policy 
University-industry collaboration
JEL Classification O3  O5
1 Introduction
The development of nanotechnology has spawned a large body of research on the eco-
nomic and societal implications of this new technology. Much of this literature argues that
nanotechnology research represents a ‘‘New Wave’’ of public policy and inter-institutional
relationships in the US national innovation system, a concept that I define in greater detail
below. At least two elements of novelty are cited by proponents of the ‘‘new wave’’
characterization (for one representative account, see Johnson 2004): (1) Federal R&D
funds are focused on economic objectives, rather than supporting fundamental research
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aimed at advancing knowledge; and (2) the policies adopted by US universities in nano-
technology research represent a new form of ‘‘post-academic research,’’ emphasizing the
commercialization of discoveries through licensing of academic patents.
In fact, however, the features of nanotechnology research cited in the previous para-
graph are not novel. Although the policies and institutions within which nanotechnology
research is carried out display some novel features, there are also important continuities in
US public policy and in the ways in which US universities have supported innovation in
nanotechnology. It seems important to focus on the elements of genuine novelty, rather
than emphasizing those that are of secondary importance, and I undertake such an analysis
in this brief survey.
2 The US ‘‘national innovation system’’
The ‘‘national innovation system’’ framework for analyzing innovative performance and
policy has been an influential area of scholarship for more than 20 years, since the first
articulation of the concept in Freeman (1987; see also Lundvall 1992 and Nelson 1993).
‘‘National’’ innovation systems typically include the institutions, policies, actors, and
processes that affect the creation of knowledge, the innovation processes that translate
research into applications (either for commercial sale or deployment in such ‘‘nonmarket’’
contexts as national defense), and processes and institutions that influence the adoption of
innovations. As such, the US national innovation system includes not just the institutions
performing R&D and the level and sources of funding for such R&D, but policies—such as
antitrust policy, intellectual property rights, and regulatory policy—that affect technology
development, the training of scientists and engineers, and technology adoption. Institutions
and policies ranging from national systems of higher education to corporate finance and
governance also are important components of national innovation systems.
Arguably, the US ‘‘national innovation system’’ is not national, since important influ-
ences on it span national borders; it clearly deals with much more than ‘‘innovation’’ alone;
and the complex and weakly coordinated interaction of public and private institutions within
it defy definitions of a ‘‘system’’ that imply planning or purposive design. Nevertheless, the
innovation system concept remains relevant and useful as a heuristic device for highlighting
elements of continuity and change in US nanotechnology policy and institutions.
3 Nanotechnology: a ‘‘new wave’’ within the US national innovation system?
The social science literature on nanotechnology has highlighted several elements of
innovation-related processes and policies as significant departures from the historic
structure of the US national innovation system. According to proponents of this argument,
the ‘‘new wave’’ is most apparent in the characteristics of federal-government funding of
nanotechnology R&D and in the inter-institutional relationships that characterize nano-
technology R&D and innovation.
In this view, the major US federal government interagency program for support of R&D
in nanotechnology, the ‘‘National Nanotechnology Initiative’’ (NNI), represents a signifi-
cant break with the philosophy underpinning federal support of R&D in industry and
especially, academia since 1945. For most of this period, supporters of the ‘‘new wave’’
argument contend, federal funding of science emphasized basic research and granted
autonomy to academic scientists in establishing their research priorities. The architect of
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this approach to R&D funding was Vannevar Bush, author of the famous 1945 report,
Science—The Endless Frontier. Bush’s argument, elaborated in economic terms by
postwar economists such as Nelson (1959) and Arrow (1962), justified public funding of
such research as necessary because of the inability of private industry to capture the
economic returns from these investments. Government support of fundamental research
thus addressed a key ‘‘market failure’’ in industrial economies and was essential to expand
the knowledge base that indirectly aided industrial innovation.
The NNI has transformed the terms of this ‘‘social contract,’’ according to some
scholars. Johnson (2004) and McCray (2005) argue that the NNI’s support of research in
universities is an example of ‘‘post-academic research’’:
This regime is characterized by an emphasis on the utility of science and the
enlistment of academic research as a ‘wealth-creating technoscientific motor for the
whole economy,’ views clearly expressed in the documents and testimony supporting
the NNI… While the end of the Cold War is certainly relevant, the changing nature
of research funded by the federal government and conducted at universities is even
more significant. Since the passage of the Bayh–Dole act in 1980, the ‘triple helix’ of
relations between the academy, industry, and government has been significantly
altered and strengthened…The borders between science and technology, as the NNI
implementation plan shows, have blurred while the commercialization of academic
science has become a key driver for its funding. (McCray 2005, p. 192).1
In this view, public funding of academic R&D in nanotechnology now is motivated by
an interest in economic outcomes, rather than a commitment to advancing fundamental
knowledge. Partly because of this emphasis on innovation-related results, the NNI also
emphasizes university-industry collaboration and ‘‘technology transfer,’’ characteristics of
research organization and policy that some scholars refer to as ‘‘Mode 2’’ (Gibbons et al.
1994) while others highlight the emergence of a ‘‘Triple Helix’’ of inter-institutional
collaboration that spans industry, government, and universities (Etzkowitz 2008).
The premise of this characterization of nanotechnology R&D as constituting a new
‘‘social contract,’’ however, relies on an inaccurate characterization of the earlier period.
Although the market failure rationale retains rhetorical influence as a justification for
public R&D investments, its influence over these investments has long been modest. Most
OECD nations’ R&D investment budgets are dominated by programs that serve specific
government missions, such as defense, agriculture, health, energy, and other activities. The
‘‘market failure’’ rationale underpins less than 50% of public R&D spending in most of
these economies.2 The United States is an outlier, with large R&D programs in defense and
1 ‘‘In the 1950s and 60s, science and technology policy was guided by the ‘pipeline’ model of the rela-
tionship of science to technology championed by Vannevar Bush … In this scheme, federally funded basic
science would provide the new knowledge that underpinned new technological developments. Government
spending needed to focus on basic, non-targeted research because this kind of scientific work was both
fundamental and less attractive to the private sector … As economic circumstances worsened after 1973,
policy makers wanted to demand more economic bang for their research buck. American scientific research
had to be part of the solution: American scientific superiority needed to translate into economic perfor-
mance. But to do so, the role of the federal government had to change, and these changes took over a decade
to put into place…
…the focus of much federal science and technology policy in the 1980s was on problems in the movement
and translation of knowledge from the lab through development into the market’’ (Johnson 2004, p. 219).
2 Data from the National Science Foundation (National Science Board 2006) on ‘‘mission-oriented’’ and
‘‘nonmission-oriented’’ R&D spending for six industrial economies (Germany, Japan, France, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and the United States) and one middle-income industrializing economy (South Korea)
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health bringing the total ‘‘mission-oriented’’ R&D budget to over 90% of federal-gov-
ernment R&D spending. Also noteworthy is the relatively small share of central-govern-
ment R&D spending accounted for by the ‘‘Bush-Arrow’’ form of R&D spending,
nonmission-oriented R&D. This class of public R&D investment accounts for nearly 30%
of reported central-government R&D spending in France and Germany, but is well below
20% in the United Kingdom and Canada, and barely exceeds 5% in the United States.
The large mission-oriented R&D programs supported by public funds in the post-1945
United States have yielded important economic benefits. Much of the innovation under-
pinning electronics and information technology (IT), ranging from semiconductor com-
ponents to computer software and the networking technologies that led to the Internet, was
supported by Defense Department funds allocated to industrial and academic researchers
(See Mowery 2010a, b). Similarly, the competitive strength of the postwar US pharma-
ceuticals and medical devices industries, as well as the growth of biotechnology, owe a
considerable debt to R&D funded by the federal government through the National Insti-
tutes of Health (Mowery et al. 2009).
The governance of many of these large public investments in mission-oriented R&D also
bears little resemblance to the idealized portrait of the ‘‘[Vannevar] Bush social contract’’3
articulated in Guston and Keniston (1994). Rather than ‘‘scientists’’ controlling the allocation
of public R&D funds, allocation decisions in these R&D programs were based on assess-
ments of the research needs of specific agency missions ranging from national defense to
agriculture.4 Although Gibbons et al. (1994) argue that ‘‘Mode 2’’ R&D is novel because it is
multidisciplinary, motivated by societal needs, and accountable to public funding agencies,
in fact ‘‘Mode 2’’ appears to resemble the mission-oriented R&D described above. The
scholarly accounts of the ‘‘new context’’ of science and technology policy in nanotechnology
overlook the longstanding prominence within US federal R&D spending of these mission-
oriented R&D programs. It is of course true that economic objectives now are more prom-
inent within the NNI programs than was true of the R&D programs of the National Institutes
of Health or the Defense Department, but this difference concerns the nature rather than the
existence of programmatic objectives that go beyond knowledge for knowledge’s sake.
4 What is new about nanotechnology in the US national innovation system?
Although some of the claims for novelty in US nanotechnology R&D and policy may be
overstated, nanotechnology R&D programs and policies do include new features that pose
Footnote 2 continued
for 2003–2004 show that in none of these nations does ‘‘nonmission’’ R&D account for as much as 50% of
central-government R&D spending, and in most of them, ‘‘mission-oriented’’ R&D spending accounts for
more than 60% of the public R&D budget. The ‘‘mission-oriented’’ categories of R&D spending, chosen to
make these national data as comparable as possible, are defense, space exploration; energy, agriculture,
industrial technology development, and health.
3 Martin (2003, p. 9) highlights ‘‘…several essential characteristics of the [Vannevar] Bush social contract.
First, it implied a high level of autonomy for science. Second, decisions on which areas of science should be
funded should be left to scientists. It therefore brought about the institutionalization of the peer-review
system to allocate resources, a system used before the Second World War by private foundations that
supported research. Third, it was premised on the belief that basic research was best done in universities
(rather than government or company laboratories).’’
4 Indeed, at least one important postwar program of defense-related R&D, the U.S. Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) initiative to create academic ‘‘centers of excellence’’ in the
embryonic field of computer science, peer review played a minimal role (see Langlois and Mowery 1996).
700 D. C. Mowery
123
challenges for the future performance of the US innovation system. These novel features
include (1) the intensive patenting of nanotechnology discoveries, including many that are
well ‘‘upstream’’ from commercial application; (2) the intensive patenting of nanotech-
nology discoveries by US research universities that seek to ‘‘transfer’’ these research
advances to commercial application through licensing; and (3) the emergence of a verti-
cally specialized structure for innovation in nanotechnology at an early stage of the
technology’s development.
These three novel elements are closely related to one another, and reflect the fact that
the development of nanotechnology, unlike IT, has from its inception taken place in an
environment of strong patentholder rights, the so-called ‘‘pro-patent era’’ in US intellectual
property rights policy that dates back to the early 1980s (see Mowery 2010c, for further
discussion). The consequences of the ‘‘pro-patent era’’ for US economic performance have
been the subject of a wide-ranging and inconclusive debate since the early 1990s. One
consequence on which there is little debate is the surge in patenting during 1980–2005.
Between 1967 and 1984, US patent applications grew by roughly 0.3% per year; after
1984, the rate of growth increased to nearly 7% per annum (Hall 2004).5
4.1 Nanotechnology R&D in the ‘‘pro-patent era’’
As an emergent technology in the ‘‘pro-patent era,’’ nanotechnology R&D has been char-
acterized by extensive patenting, and some observers argue that these patents now cover
scientific concepts, rather than innovations that are nearer to commercialization. This char-
acteristic of nanotechnology contrasts with earlier postwar technological innovations, such as
semiconductors, computer hardware, or computer software, all of which faced an intellectual
property-rights policy environment that was more hostile to patentholder rights. In addition, a
combination of federal antitrust policy actions affecting producers of computers and semi-
conductor components, as well as uncertainty over the patentability of life forms,6 meant that
in most of these previous major technological clusters, intellectual property rights were both
weaker and more uncertain in the earliest years of the technologies’ development.
As Lemley (2005) has noted, the development of nanotechnology presents an interesting
social experiment on the effects of extensive patenting on foundational technological or
scientific advances in the early years of development of a technology:
In most other fields of invention over the past century in what we might think of as
‘‘enabling’’ technologies—computer hardware, software, the Internet, even bio-
technology—the basic building blocks of the field were unpatented, either because
they were created by government or university scientists with no interest in patents,
or through mistake, or because the government compelled licensing of the patents, or
because the patents were ultimately invalidated. (2005, p. 7)
5 Other scholars have suggested that this surge in patent applications, particularly those involving relatively
new fields of inventive activity such as computer software, has taxed the review capabilities of the U.S.
Patent Office, leading to an increase in low-quality patents (Merges 1999).
6 Although biotechnology and biomedical R&D generally now are characterized by strong patents, as I note
below, in its early years, biotechnology was characterized by considerable uncertainty over the patentability
of key research advances. As a result, foundational biotechnology patents, including the Cohen-Boyer and
Axel patents, were licensed nonexclusively and at relatively modest royalty rates (see Mowery et al. 2004).
A March 2010 federal court decision, coupled with the filing in late October 2010 by the U.S. Justice
Department of a ‘‘friend of the court’’ brief in connection with an appeal of this decision that opposes the
patentability of human genes, may once again create significant uncertainty about the strength of patents in
some fields of biotechnology (see Pollack 2010).
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Although nanotechnology patenting has been extensive, few if any of the major
nanotechnology patents have been challenged in court, nor have infringement actions been
resolved on terms that establish the value of these patents. Uncertainty about the value of
nanotechnology patents nevertheless has not prevented rapid growth in such patenting. The
share of patenting by US-based entities accounted for by the ‘‘nanotechnology’’ patent
class, 977, which was created by the USPTO in 1975, grew from nothing to slightly more
than 0.4% by 20017
The rapid growth in nanotechnology patenting has been driven in part by US univer-
sities, another characteristic of nanotechnology R&D that is both novel and potentially
challenging for the US national innovation system. US universities, which accounted for
less than 2% of all US patents during 1975–2002, hold more than 15% of all US patents in
nanotechnology. Conversely, US corporations’ share of nanotechnology patents is smaller
than their share of overall US patents.
4.2 ‘‘Post-academic research’’ in US universities before and after the Bayh-Dole Act
A central part of the argument made by advocates of the ‘‘transformation’’ in US uni-
versities’ role within the US national innovation system with the rise of nanotechnology
concerns the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and the subsequent expansion of university patenting.
Although US universities have increased their patenting and licensing activities since the
1980 Act, this shift in the characteristics of university research in fact represents an
extension in a longstanding trend, rather than a transformative event.
Collaboration between university and industrial researchers, combined with the focus of
many US university researchers on scientific problems with important industrial or agri-
cultural applications, meant that a number of US universities patented faculty inventions
throughout the twentieth century. The decade of the 1970s, as much as or more so than the
1980s, represented a watershed in the growth of US university patenting and licensing. US
universities expanded their patenting, especially in biomedical fields, and assumed a more
prominent role in managing their patenting and licensing activities (see Mowery and
Sampat 2001). Private universities expanded their patenting and licensing during this
decade, and the share of biomedical technologies within US university patents began to
grow in 1972, well before the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.
Having assumed responsibility for management of their patenting and licensing activ-
ities, US universities began to chafe against the restrictions on their licensing activities
imposed by some federal research funding agencies (notably, the U.S. National Institutes
of Health, NIH). Lobbying by US research universities to reduce federal oversight of
licensing was an important factor behind the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. The
Act is as much an effect as a cause of expanded patenting and licensing by US universities
during the post-1960 period.
How did the Bayh-Dole Act affect patenting by US universities? Universities increased
their share of patenting from less than 0.3% in 1963 to nearly 4% by 1999, but the rate of
growth in this share begins to accelerate before rather than after 1980. Another issue of
interest in academic patenting is the distribution among technology fields of Dechenaux,
E., Thursby, M. & Thursby, J during the pre- and post-Bayh-Dole periods. Nonbiomedical
university patents increased by 90% from the 1968–1970 period to the 1978–1980 period,
but biomedical university patents increased by 295%. Evidence cited in Mowery et al.
7 Since this patent class includes a number of patents that in earlier years would have been classified
elsewhere, this measure of growth in the share of ‘‘nanotechnology’’ patents is somewhat overstated.
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(2004) reveals that gross licensing revenues for Columbia University, Stanford University,
and the University of California system during the period after the passage of the Bayh-
Dole Act were dominated by a small number of patents. For each of these three univer-
sities, the ‘‘top 5’’ patents accounted for more than 65% of gross licensing revenues. These
‘‘top 5’’ patents were mainly biomedical inventions.
The dominance of US university licensing revenues since Bayh-Dole by licenses for
biomedical patents reflects the unusual legal strength and economic value of patents in this
field (see Levin et al. 1987). The significantly higher economic value of patents in these
fields reflects the fact that they are very difficult to ‘‘invent around,’’ as well as the
tendency for one or a small number of patents to effectively cover all relevant aspects of a
specific invention.
The legal and economic value of patents in biomedical technologies contrasts with their
more limited effectiveness in other fields, notably information technology and electronics,
where a given innovation draws on many different patents, the power of any single one of
which to exclude imitators is much more uncertain.8 The more limited power of patents in
these fields is reflected in their modest contributions to university licensing revenues.
Surveys of industrial R&D managers also indicate that patents per se play only a minor role
as channels of knowledge transfer from academia to industry (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen
et al. 2002) in fields other than pharmaceuticals or chemicals.
In light of the limited effectiveness of patents for licensing and technology transfer in
fields outside of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and biomedical technologies, academic pat-
enting of nanotechnology inventions may be of secondary importance in technology
transfer. Indeed, Mody’s discussion (2006) of the development of probe microscopy, a
critical innovation for nanotechnology R&D, emphasizes the informal, interactive char-
acter of the collaborations between university and industry researchers that spawned the
production of probe electron microscopes for application in university and industrial
research.9 Patent licensing was of little importance in facilitating these interactions. Do the
characteristics of nanotechnology R&D and innovation in other fields resemble those
described by Mody, or is this interactive, informal pattern of collaboration unique to
nanotechnology-related instrumentation? At least some senior managers at US firms,
including managers of large-scale nanotechnology R&D programs, argue that university
licensing policies impede industry-university collaboration (see Williams 2002).10
8 In their work on university-industry interactions in the biotechnology industry, Zucker and Darby (2005)
and Zucker et al. (1998) emphasize the role of academic scientists collaborating or consulting with industrial
researchers as a crucial channel of technology transfer, reflecting the ‘‘natural excludability’’ of early-stage
biotechnology research advances, which involve a significant element of tacit knowledge that is not easily
communicated through a licensing agreement.
9 Mody also criticizes the characterization of nanotechnology research as ‘‘post-academic’’ in terms similar
to those used in this paper: ‘‘There was no golden age in which faculty operated independently of commerce,
pursuing disinterested research. Knowledge-production in physics, engineering, and chemistry was always
aided by academic consulting and the exchanging of personnel and ideas. The oft-criticized commercialism
of the ‘‘biotech revolution’’ merely extended long-standing entrepreneurial practices into molecular biol-
ogy’’ (2006, p. 80).
10 ‘‘Largely as a result of the lack of federal funding for research, American Universities have become
extremely aggressive in their attempts to raise funding from large corporations … Large US based cor-
porations have become so disheartened and disgusted with the situation they are now working with foreign
universities, especially the elite institutions in France, Russia and China, which are more than willing to
offer extremely favorable intellectual property terms.’’ (R. Stanley Williams, HP Labs, September 17, 2002;
statement reproduced at http://www.memagazine.org/contents/current/webonly/webex319.html; accessed
April 2, 2005).
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The broader effects of patenting embryonic scientific discoveries on the progress of
basic scientific research also are uncertain. Will university intellectual property regulations
interfere with the free flow and exchange of information and research materials, either
through patenting of inputs to science or through other restrictions on information
exchange?11
A substantial body of work has examined the effects of academic patenting on the flow
of scientific information among researchers (Blumenthal et al. 1997; Campbell et al. 2002;
Murray and Stern 2007; Sampat 2004; Walsh et al. 2005; Lei et al. 2009), and has reached
a mixed verdict. On the one hand, publications covering discoveries that eventually are
patented appear to experience a drop in citations after the patents issue, suggesting that the
patents cause other researchers to direct their effort elsewhere. On the other hand, aca-
demic researchers report that they are (purposefully or otherwise) unaware of the existence
of patents on a given area of research. What then appears to cause academic researchers to
shift their research away from topics for which patents have been issued to other
researchers?
One explanation for these apparently conflicting findings hypothesizes that researchers
are less likely to obtain essential research materials (biological materials or research tools)
from other researchers when these materials are covered by patents. An instrument of
growing importance in the governance of transfers of materials among researchers in both
academia and industry is the ‘‘Materials Transfer Agreement’’ (MTA). MTAs are agree-
ments among researchers governing the transfer and exchange of biological materials used
in research. Their complexity and detailed provisions vary, but many of them include
provisions for ‘‘reach-through’’ royalties on patents resulting from the use of the materials,
and other such agreements limit the ability of the recipient of the materials to patent or
license the results of research using the materials.
Historically, materials exchanges were governed by little more than a letter from the
source accompanying the materials, requesting acknowledgement and in some cases
asking that the materials not be passed on to third parties (see McCain 1991). The more
elaborate MTAs used in contemporary materials exchanges appear to be a byproduct of
the post-1980 surge in academic patenting.12 MTAs are used widely by both industry and
academic researchers, and cover exchanges of materials within industry, within acade-
mia, and between industry and academia. MTAs are especially widespread in biomedical
research, an area in which nanotechnology researchers are increasingly active.
According to Walsh et al. (2007) academic researchers reported that denial by other
researchers of requests for materials did impede their work. But this study provides
no information on the extent to which MTAs typically covered transfers of research
materials associated with patented research results. Walsh et al. (2007) also reported that
11 Zucker and Darby (2005) argue that the importance for nanotechnology of innovation in instruments that
were commercially available within 5 years of their development has reduced the ‘‘natural excludability’’
associated with nanotechnology, in contrast to biotechnology. They note, however, that ‘‘…the uses that
these instruments are being put [sic] involves areas which are very imperfectly understood and other new
methods of inventing may be at least as important as scanning probe microscopy. Thus the involvement of
the inventing scientists may be very valuable in commercialization, and we note that many of the best nano
scientists and engineers maintain their academic positions and research programs while co-founding and
guiding new entrants or continuing relationships collaborating at the bench-science level with scientists from
incumbent firms.’’ (pp. 161–162).
12 Respondents to the survey of University of California agricultural biotechnology researchers by Lei et al.
(2009) report ‘‘moderately more’’ use of MTAs than in 1999.
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more than one-quarter of the MTAs used by researchers took more than 1 month to
finalize. Data from the University of California, Davis technology transfer office indicate
that MTAs with private-sector entities (either MTAs requesting materials from private-
sector researchers or MTAs that furnish UC Davis research materials to industrial
researchers) especially likely to incur delays.13 If patented research findings are more
commonly associated with the use of MTAs on exchanges of these or related research
materials, the conflicting results on the impediments to scientific research created by
patents might be reconciled. With the exception of one preliminary analysis of this pos-
sibility (Mowery and Ziedonis 2007), the correlation between patents and MTAs has not
been examined.
The increased salience and complexity of MTAs within biomedical research indicate a
potential for the growing assertion by universities of intellectual property rights to affect
the disposition of inputs to, as opposed to the results of, scientific research. Considerable
work remains to be done on the effects of MTAs on scientific communication, and on the
relationship between patenting of university research advances and the use of MTAs. Little
if anything is known about the prevalence of MTAs in nanotechnology research, although
the importance of access to specialized instrumentation and materials in the field suggests
that they could play a significant role in the future. In addition, much recent US com-
mercial R&D in nanotechnology has focused on biomedical applications, further
increasing the likelihood that MTAs affecting nanotechnology materials could affect
research in this area.14
4.3 Vertical specialization in nanotechnology innovation
The structure of industrial innovation in nanotechnology in the ‘‘pro-patent era’’ con-
trasts with that of innovation in other US post-1945 ‘‘new industries,’’ particularly
semiconductors and computers. Innovation in the early development of these industries
was dominated by vertically integrated industrial enterprises that conducted fundamental
research, developed new products, and manufactured these new products within a single
organization (in many cases, producing the equipment needed to manufacture semi-
conductors or computer components). The current organization of commercial nano-
technology innovation, however, resembles that of biotechnology. Firms specializing in
research and very early-stage development (often, spinoffs from university laboratories)
seek to license their products to established producers of related products in pharma-
ceuticals, medical equipment, or materials. Nanotechnology innovation involves con-
tractual and collaborative relationships among a number of ‘‘vertically specialized’’
firms that each specialize in one segment of the overall process of commercial
innovation.
The similarities between the industrial structure of nanotechnology and biotechnology
innovation reflect the fact that in both sectors, universities play a prominent role as sources
of technological advances that are licensed, and university-based spinoff firms are an
13 These data exclude MTAs that are never finalized, and that failure in negotiations is also more likely for
materials transfers to or from private-sector laboratories.
14 A recent OECD study (2007) found that the United States accounted for a disproportionate share of
biomedical patent activity in nanotechnology, reflecting the abundance of research funding from the U.S.
National Institutes of Health and the profitable domestic market for new medical devices and drugs in the
United States.
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important source of entry into the industry.15 The strong intellectual property-rights
environment characteristic of the current period favors the growth of ‘‘markets for tech-
nology,’’ in which strong IP rights favor the use of contracts and markets for collaboration
(Arora et al. 2001).
Economists long have emphasized the efficiency gains associated with firm-level spe-
cialization, and at least some scholars have argued that specialization leads to higher levels
of innovative performance in vertically specialized industries.16 But there are important
countervailing factors that are unique to the innovation process, such as severe uncertainty
about the true value or commercial prospects of a given piece of intellectual property, the
potential for misrepresentation or opportunistic behavior within arms-length contracting
relationships, and the inability of contracts to deal with a wide array of unanticipated
contingencies in the process of taking fundamental research to the point of
commercialization.
All of these factors may undercut the innovation-related efficiency gains of vertically
specialized industries, and these countervailing factors are likely to be more significant and
pervasive in the early stages of a technology’s development. Not only are technological
and commercial uncertainty likely to be greatest in these early stages, but the parties to
contractual agreements in the innovation process are likely to be less aware of the presence
and implications of such uncertainties, and therefore less proficient at managing them.
With the development of an industry or technology, these underlying uncertainties may be
reduced and the ability of firms, inventors, and entrepreneurs to manage them may improve
as a result of experience.
Most of the industries within IT now have shifted to a vertically specialized structure—
in semiconductors, specialist firms are separately responsible for design of semiconductor
components, while others specialize in production. The emergence of specialist producers
of computer software and hardware has produced a similar structure of vertical special-
ization in the computer industry, which formerly relied on firms ‘‘bundling’’ software and
hardware. The development of a vertically specialized industry structure in IT was asso-
ciated with the emergence of ‘‘modular architectures,’’ i.e., technological subsystems that
have relatively stable interfaces with others, such as software and hardware within com-
puters. But no similarly modular architecture has yet emerged within nanotechnology, and
as a result, collaboration among specialized firms in innovation is likely to remain
challenging.
It is too early to reach any conclusions about the effects on innovative performance of
the vertically specialized structure that characterizes nanotechnology R&D at present.
Nevertheless, the recent experience of the US biotechnology industry presents some
cautionary evidence. As Cockburn (2004, 2006) has noted, vertical specialization within
US biotechnology thus far has failed to produce either significant overall returns for
shareholders in biotechnology firms or a dramatic increase in the rate of new drug intro-
duction by the large pharmaceutical firms that are primarily responsible for developing the
15 Numerous scholars, most notably Zucker and Darby (2005), Zucker et al. (2007) and Darby and Zucker
(2005), have commented on the similarities between biotechnology and nanotechnology—for a survey of
this work, see Huang et al. (2010). But this extensive literature has devoted little attention to the implications
of vertical specialization for the commercial development of nanotechnology applications.
16 See Arora et al. (2001, p. 114): ‘‘…we strongly believe that such markets [for technology] can have
substantial benefits by encouraging more extensive use of existing technologies and an increase in the rate of
technological change…’’.
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drugs that biotechnology ‘‘R&D boutiques’’ specialize in discovering.17 The number of
new drugs approved annually by the US Food and Drug Administration for commercial use
declined significantly during 1994–2004, a period characterized by considerable expansion
in the use by pharmaceuticals firms of alliances and vertical licensing arrangements, in the
face of much higher levels of R&D spending within the industry (Berenson 2006).
The validity of these measures of innovation in the pharmaceutical industry is subject to
debate (e.g., counts of the number of new drugs approved for marketing say little or
nothing about the therapeutic value or economic significance of individual drugs), and
numerous other factors beyond the vertically specialized structure that has emerged within
US pharmaceuticals play important roles in these trends. Nonetheless, the fact remains that
the growth of such a vertically specialized structure is not associated with a significant
increase in the (imperfectly measured) rate of innovation.
The emergence of a vertically specialized structure of innovation in nanotechnology at
such an early point in the development of this technology reflects the interaction of several
novel features of the environment surrounding innovation in nanotechnology—the
changing role of universities as sources of patented technologies for license is closely
linked with the broader shifts in US intellectual property-rights policy that were discussed
earlier. Whether and how entrepreneurs and innovators will be able to manage the com-
plexities of a vertically specialized structure for innovation remains to be seen.
5 Conclusion
Forecasting the pace and economic effects of the future development of nanotechnology is
hazardous, as the 2006 report of the National Research Council’s review of the NNI
noted.18 Instead, this paper has examined the ways (if any) in which the current institu-
tional structure and public policies within the evolving nanotechnology R&D enterprise
represent a departure from longstanding characteristics of the post-1945 US national
17 ‘‘In general, one can be optimistic about efficiency being raised by increased vertical specialization in
industries where competition is high among horizontal segments, where specialization reduces costs, where
vertical coordination is relatively unimportant, where prices for the upstream technology accurately reflect
marginal opportunity costs, and where bargaining and contracting are easy and effective.
Is this the case in early-stage pharmaceutical research? Several aspects of the economic relationship
between biotech tool companies and Big Pharma suggest otherwise. Muted price signals from end users,
high levels of uncertainty, high transaction costs and serious contracting problems, and limited competition
in specific areas of technology all make finding an efficient vertically dis-integrated solution less likely….
For economists, excess entry, high failure rates, and the inability to make profits are signs of overin-
vestment, ‘‘wrong prices,’’ and misallocation of resources. Anecdotal evidence and the relatively low
average stock market returns from biotechnology companies over the past few decades support this pes-
simistic view.’’ (Cockburn, 2004, p. 20).
18 ‘‘…efforts to analyze R&D’s economic impact in other areas have often been hindered by a lack of
metrics and lack of a comprehensive empirical framework…Assessing economic impact is also challenging
because of the complexity of forces that drive economic growth and the inherent uncertainty surrounding
outcomes observed at a particular point in time. Moreover, in general the timescales from research-based
discovery to commercialization of technologies are long, often 20 years or more, and as an enabling
technology, nanotechnology in particular is still in its infancy. The timescales over which the cumulative
benefits of nanoscale R&D will become apparent will vary, depending on the nature of individual industries
and products and the kinds of developmental research and testing required, such as clinical trials. Also, the
investment needed for change and the availability of sustained investment for long-term gain will be
determining factors. Although it is clear that nanotechnology will have an impact on many applications and
industries, how to measure its economic impact is not now clear.’’ (National Research Council 2006,
pp. 61–62).
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innovation system. Although I disagree with the current characterizations that claim that
this institutional emergent structure is novel, several important elements of the current
structure of nanotechnology R&D contrast with those of previous postwar innovations,
most notably semiconductors and computers.
One area of similarity among these innovations is in the characteristics of and motives
for federal-government R&D funding. Although the emphasis in federally funded nano-
technology R&D on economic objectives may represent a change, the focus on specific
policy objectives, as well as the cross-institutional collaboration that federal R&D pro-
grams encourage, is not novel.
Perhaps the most significant feature distinguishing nanotechnology from the IT-related
innovations noted above is the transformation in the intellectual property rights environ-
ment that has occurred since 1980. Patents have been obtained by both academic and
industrial researchers on a broad array of fundamental advances in nanotechnology in the
very early stages of this technology’s development, unlike the situation at a similarly early
stage in the development of IT or even biotechnology. In spite of considerable evidence
that patents and licenses may be ineffective mechanisms for collaboration and technology
transfer in fields other than chemistry and the biomedical sciences, US universities have
intensified their reliance on patents in nanotechnology R&D. Moreover, if the extensive
use of patents by academic researchers in nanotechnology expands their use of Materials
Transfer Agreements, especially in nanotechnology research related to the life sciences,
additional impediments to the conduct of fundamental science in this new field of research
could appear.
Such impediments to research and technology development can be reduced through
changes in US universities’ technology licensing policies. Universities should develop
policies that recognize the differences among research fields in the strength of patents and
the benefits of patent licensing for technology transfer in different fields. Although some
universities have begun to examine such policies, there has been surprising little experi-
mentation with alternatives to the patent-centered model of technology transfer in the
30 years since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. In addition, universities must ensure that
MTAs facilitate, and do not restrict, the flow of research tools and materials among their
scientists.
Change in the characteristics of university-industry interaction and intellectual prop-
erty policy have combined to produce a structure for industrial innovation that contrasts
with that observed in the early years of the IT sector and resembles more closely the
structure that has emerged in biotechnology. This vertically specialized structure of
innovation in a technology that is in its early stages of development and subject to
enormous technical and commercial uncertainties, combined with the difficulties of
writing contracts that can deal with unforeseen contingencies and opportunistic behavior,
may have impeded the productivity of drug discovery and development within bio-
technology. Whether vertical specialization in nanotechnology innovation will prove
similarly difficult to manage is another area of uncertainty, albeit one with important
implications for the future.
It may well be the case that in both biotechnology-based drug development and the
development of commercial applications of nanotechnology, alternatives to the current
vertically specialized industry structures will be needed. Market forces and experimenta-
tion with alternative organizational forms may support the development of alternatives to
vertical specialization. The evolution of public policy, however, may be less responsive to
market forces. And as I have noted above, a central factor in the emergence of the
innovation system within which nanotechnology R&D is evolving in both the US and
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global economies is the stronger formal intellectual property rights environment. The
expansion of patenting into the realm of scientific research has the potential for creating
significant impediments to the advance of fundamental research in this field. Both patents
and potentially, MTAs can limit the flow of knowledge and results among scientists in
academia and industry, although the extent and significance of any such impediments
remain uncertain at present.
It is important for the successful exploitation of the scientific advances represented by
nanotechnology that federal funding agencies participating in the NNI develop policies that
support the free flow of scientific information among US and foreign researchers. In
considering such policies, the NNI can benefit from the experiences of the US National
Institutes of Health, the leading federal supporter of basic biomedical research. For more
than a decade, the NIH has experimented with policies seeking to prevent the growth of
various formal intellectual-property instruments, including patents and MTAs, from cre-
ating serious frictions in the biomedical research enterprise.19 NIH is an important funder
of NNI R&D, but its experience in developing policies to reduce impediments to the flow
of scientific knowledge among biomedical researchers should be exploited for the devel-
opment of NNI policies related to intellectual property and the sharing of research results
and materials. NNI would do well to try to summarize and exploit the ‘‘lessons’’ of these
NIH policies. Such an effort could accelerate scientific progress and potentially, com-
mercial applications in this important new field of science.
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